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Choice of Law as General Common Law:
A Reply to Professor Brilmayer

Michael Steven Green

I TRODUCTIO
In the first footnote of her chapter, Lea Brilmayer mentions "significant overlap" with two recent papers of mine. If anyone should be making acknowledgments, I should . She has long argued that the law of choice of law, even in its
modern interest-analysis incarnations, is a disguised form of general common
law, and that it o ught to be reformed in the spirit of Erie. 1 In taking up this
argument myself, I am in her debt. 2
To get the basic idea, consider a varia tion on Kuchinic v. McCrory ) Ass ume
a Georgia pilot invites another Georgian to Ay with him to attend a football
game in ew York. On the way the plane crashes in Pennsylvania. A Georgia
statute prohibits guests from suing their hosts for negligence. Pennsylvan ia law
has no such prohibition. Had it enterta ined the action, the G eorgia Supreme
Court would have applied Pennsylvan ia law to the facts . However, the guest
chooses to sue the host in Vermont state court instead. May it apply Georgia
law?
Under every choice-of-law approach currently used by state co urts - from the
First Restatement to mode rn interest analys is- the mere fact that the G eorgia
Supreme Court would not apply Georgia law does not prohibit the forum from
doing so. A state supreme court's refu sal to apply its law to interjuri sdictional
fac ts does not bind sister states.

' Indeed, she is probably the first to make thi s argum ent. Lea Brilmayer, "Methods and Ob jectives
in the Con Aict of Laws: A C hallenge," Mercer Law Review 35 (1984): 555-563, precedes umy
Kramer, "Return of the Renvoi ," New York University Law Review 66 (1991): 979-1044.
' I a lso owe a debt to Larry Kramer and particula rly to Kim Rooseve lt, who e article Kern1it Roosevelt Ill, "Resolving Renvo i: Th e Bewitchment of Our Inte lligence by M eans of Language,"
Notre Dame l .aw Review So (2005): 1821-1891, started me thinking about these matters.
l See 422 Pa. 6zo (1966).
125
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Erie Railroad v. Tompkins is common ly understood as standing for the
propos iti on that a state supreme court is the auth ority on that state's law.4
Beca use it is hard to see wh y this authority would evaporate when the question
is th e applicability of the state's law to interjurisdictional facts, it looks like the
Ve rmont state co urt must respect the G eorgia Supre me C ourt's dec ision not to
apply G eorgia law. T his duty of deference is not merely part of proper conflicts
law; it is a constitu tional obliga tion , appli ca ble to th e Vermont state court by
means of th e F ull Faith and Credit C lause.5 (We can call this obligation
"hori zonta l Erie," to di stinguish it from its ve rtical equi va lent.)
One te rmi nological quibbl e: As Professor Brilmaye r desc ribes it, respec ting
a state supre me court's c ho ice-of-law dec isions am ounl·s to accepting renvo i. I
di sagree. Under the doctrine of renvo i, th e Vermont state court should app ly
Pennsylvania law, because that is the law that wou ld be c hosen by the Geo rgia
~See

Erie Railroad v. '/'ompkin, , 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
; I mgue that federal co urts' v:rie obligations apply hori zontally, by mea ns of th e Full Fa ith and
C redit C lause, to sta te courts inte rpreti ng siste r state law in Part II of Michae l Steven Green ,
"Hori zo ntal Erie and the Presumpti on of Forum Law," Michigan Law Review 109 (2011 ): 12371291 (he reinafter Green, " Horizontal"). I furth e r mgue th<lt horizont<li Erie compel s a state
court to respect sister state choice-of-law dec isions wh en dete rm ining whethe r sister state law
appli es in Pa rt IV of Mi chael Steven G reen, "Erie's Suppressed Premise," Minnesota Law
Review 95 (2011 ): 1111- 11 69 (he re ina fter G reen , "S uppressed"). Kim Rooseve lt gives a sim ilar
a rgument at Roosevelt, "Resolving Re nvoi," 1841 , 1856-1857. As Professor Bri lmayer m akes
clear in he r reply, howeve r, I should not have attributed these views to her. She is agnosti c
a bout wheth er a co nstitutional du ty to defe r to a siste r sta te's choice-of-law decisions exists.
Alth o ugh anyone skepti ca l abo ut the idea ofh ori zontal/•:rie sho uld examine my argument in
G reen, "H o rizonta l," I would li ke to bri e Ry defe nd my positi on in th e face of the disa na logies
Professo r Bri lmaye r identifies between ve rtica l l•:rie a nd the Full Fa ith and C redit C lause.
She is quite right that verti ca l l<rie o bliga tes a federa l court sitting in di ve rsity to use the
forum state's statute of limitati ons (or, m ore accurate ly, the limitations that wo uld be used by
a forum state co urt) and no comparab le hori zo ntal obl iga ti on arises und e r the F ull Fa ith and
C redit C lause. Noneth eless, a dist·incti on should be drawn between the constituti onal and the
no nconstitutionall <rie doctrines. G ree n, "H orizontal," S !.1 ; see also Byrd v. Blue l{idge Rural
Elec. Coup., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-537 (1958); Ada m N. Ste inman, ·'what is th e l•:rie Doctrin e?
(And W hat Does It Mea n fo r the Contem porary Politics of judic ial Fede rali m?)," Notre Dame
l .aw Review 84 (2oo8 ): 316-327. It is th e nonconstituti o nal Erie doctrine 1'11at obliga tes a federal
co urt to use the forum state's st<ltute of limitati ons, as a means of avo iding foru m sho ppi ng
and the in equita ble administrati on of the laws. See /I anna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 46o, 467-468
(1965 ). My argume nt in G ree n, " Hori zontal," is th<ll on ly th e constituti onal Erie doctrine has
its horizontal equi va lent in the Fu ll Fa ith a nd C redit C lause.
Professor Bri lmayer is a bso lu tely right, however, tha t th e Full Fa ith a nd C red it C lause
ca nnot obliga te a state court to respect a sister state's choice-of-law rules if these ru le a re
conce ived of as procedura l, along the lines of statutes of li mitati ons. Anoth er very important
di fference betwee n us, the refore, is that, like Larry Kramer a nd Kim Roosevel t, I think that
choice-of-law ru les can be substanti ve. See G reen, "Suppressed," Part· IV; Krame r, "Retu rn ,"
1043-1044; Roosevelt, " Resolving Renvo i," 1883.
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Supreme Court. 6 However, renvo i itself looks incompatible with horizon tal
Erie, beca use the choice of Pennsylvania law is made without regard for the
decisions of the Pennsylvan ia Supreme Court. Proper defe rence to the Georgia
Supreme Court is shown by concluding not that Pennsylvania law applies, but
only that Georgia law does not.
I agree with Professo r Brilmayer that horizontal Erie compels the forum
to defer to a state supre me court's c hoice-of-law dec isions when dete rmining
whether the state's law applies.7 Nonetheless, I'm not going to defend our
position here. My goal is the more modest one of identifying two obstacles tha t
our position must overcome. The first, of which I am sure Professor Brilmayer
is aware, is that deference can genera te puzzles when two state supreme courts
wou ld apply one another's law . Th e second obstacle is, I think, even more
serious: Lack of deference to a state supreme court's cho ice-of-law decisions
might be compatible with hori zontal Erie, for th e simple reason that the state
supreme court doesn 't want deference.
After describing these two obstacles, I'll end by making a few observations
about two different themes in Professor Brilmayer's chapter: her advocacy of
the common law method in choice ofla w and her worry that choice of law is
necessarily committed to some "unid entified Archimedean vantage point. "

TH E PUZZLE OF MUTUAL DEFERENCE

1.

Let us ass ume that sister states must always respec t a state supreme court's
dec ision not to apply its law. So our Vermont state court cannot apply Georgia
law if the Georgia Supreme Court would apply Pennsylvania law. But what if
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply Georgia la w? It looks like the
Vermont court is prohibited from applying both Pennsylvan ia and Georgia
law. How shoul.d it respond to this legal void, given that it pro bably lacks the
power to fil l it wi th Vermont law?
One possibility is that it should dismiss for failure to state a claim .8 However,
isn't that still the applicati on of law (in effec t, Georgia law)? After all , doesn 't
dismissal for failure to state a claim mean that th e plaintiff is not lega lly en titled
to relief? Perhaps it should instead dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, without
getting to the merits.
6

Or rather, it shou ld apply Pe nnsylvania law und er the doc trine of re nvoi , assuming th<lt its
choice-of-law ru les point to Georgia law.
7 Once again , Professor Brilmayer has made it clear that she takes no stand about whether there
is such a constitutiona l duty of deference; see note 5·
KSee Roosevelt, "Resolving Renvoi," 1884-1886.
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Is it reall y true, however, that the supre me co urts of Geo rg ia and Pennsylvania have decided that th e ir laws do not appl y to th e fac ts? W eren't th e ir
dec isions predi ca ted on an error (indeed , a constit·utionally prohibited error),
namely that the law of th e oth er state could be applied ? If, however, eac h state
suprem e court has no t yet dec ided the matte r, how is th e Ve rmont court to
determin e how th ey will dec ide it, given that th e dec i ion of eac h depend
cruc ially on what the oth er will do?
It may be beca use of th e puzzle of mutual deference tha t Professor Brilmaye r
says that ren voi is a "useful tool," rather than an infallibl e guide, to th e scope
of sister state law. Like Larry Krame r and Kim Roosevelt, she may be arguing
that a state supre me court's c ho ice-of-law dec isions onl y sometimes bind sister
states. As Kramer and Roosevelt understand it, c ho ice-of-law rules come in two
fl avo rs: rules of priority and rul es of scope.9 If a sta te supre me co urt c hooses
not to apply its own law, it·s dec ision binds siste r states onl y if it was based on
a rule of scope.
Con icie r a state supre me court empl oying inte re I analys is. If it concludes
that no forum interest would be adva nced by applying its law, it employs a rule
of scope. It is saying, in effect, that th e fac ts do not fall under its law. Beca use,
uncler horizontal Erie, it is the authority on th e matter, its dec ision binds sister
sta tes . However, Kramer and Roosevelt argue, wh en it chooses anoth er state'
law beca use it thinks that state's inte rests are greater than its own, its decision
does not bind sister states .' 0 It has not held that its la w does not apply to the
fac ts, onl y that its law, despite applying, should not be given priori ty to the
law of th e other state . Sister states are entitl ed to have th eir own views on that
questi on.
Krame r and Roosevelt di sagree about wheth e r the traditi onal approac h, as
exe mplified in the First Restate ment, consists of rules of pri ority or rules of
scope . Kra mer thinks the traditional approac h ass umes that the fac ts are within
th e scope of th e compe ting states' laws simply by undertaking th e c hoice-oflaw inquiry. As a res ult, th e First Res tatem ent consists of rul es of pri ori ty and
a tate supre me court's adoption of th e First Restatement does not bind sister
states ."
9
'

0

11

T he tenm are Roosevelt's. Ibi d., 187 1.
Although it was inAuenced by interest analysis, they both argue that th e Second Restatemen t
consists onl y of rul es of priority, because it does not have an explicit two-step inq ui ry in which
state in te rests are fi rst identi fied and then con Ai cts between th ose in terests are resolved. It
instead adopts a one-s tep approach that takes into acco unt both state interests and means of
reso lving conAi cts of interests. See Heslalemenl (Secrmd) o{Co nflicl o{l .ow.~ (St. Pa ul: American
Law Institute, 197 1), ~ 6 ; Kra mer, .. Retu m," 1041- 1043; Roosevelt, "Reso lving Renvoi," 1877,
1886.
Kratne r, "Return / ' IO£t2-I043-
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In contrast, Roosevelt argues that historically the traditional approach
saw choice-of-law rules as enforc ing preexisting limits on states' law-making
power.' 2 If a First Restatement court refuses to apply its tort law to an accident
because it occurred out of state, it has concluded that its law cannot apply
(even though it might in fact have law-making power as a constitutional matter). Beca use the First Restatement consists of rules of scope, a state supreme
court's decision to adopt it binds sister states.' 3
Krame r and Roosevelt's approach would solve our puzzle of mutual deference if the Georgia Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
applied one another's law as a result of rules of priority, not rules of scope. In
such a case, the Vermont court would be free to use its own rules of priority
to choose between Pennsylvania and Georgia law. Indeed, it could choose
Georgia law even if the Pennsylvania and Georgia Supreme Courts' rules of
priority agreed that Pennsylvania law should be applied.
onetheless, Kramer and Roosevelt's approach cannot solve the problem of
two state supreme courts that refuse to apply their own law as a result of rules of
scope. Assume that the Georgia Supreme Court wouldn't apply Georgia law
because it accepts the First Restatement; further ass ume that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, employing interest ana lys is, wou ldn't apply Pennsylvania law
because it thinks Pennsylvania has no interest. If Roosevelt is right about the
First Restatement consisti ng of rules of scope, then the Vermont state court is
once again faced with a legal void.'4

11 .

IS THE CE ERAL COMMON LAW I COMPATIBLE WITH ERIE?

The puzzle of mutual deference is not the only obstacle that must be overcome
by any approach that demands deference for state supreme courts' choice-oflaw decisions. There is another obstacle that is even more serious.
As Professor Brilmayer accurately describes it, prevailing choice-of-law
approaches are urreptitiously committed to the general common law. AVermont state court can ignore what the Georgia Supreme Court says about the
'

1

4

Roosevelt, "Resolvi ng Renvoi," 1878-1879.
'3 Ibid., 1882-1884.
One might argue that if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used interest analysis, it would
not concl ude that Pennsylv.mi a law does not apply at all, but only that it does not apply
concerni ng the question of whether there is an affirmative defense on the basis of the guesthost relationship. ee Larry Kram er, ''The Myth of the 'Unprovided-For' Case," Virginia Law
Review 75 (1989}: 1056-106o. After all , Pennsylva nia does have an interest in applying the res/
of its tort law, as a means of di couraging plane crashes in Pennsylvania . Even if that is true,
though , there remains the legal void conce rning the affirmative defense. One cannot say that
the allirn1ative defense is or is not available without appl ying law - and there is no law to
apply.
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applica bility of Georgia law to interjurisdictional facts beca use Georgia law
(a t leas t in its territorial scope) is treated like the general common law was in
Swift v. Tyson.
T he obstacle is this: T he Swifl"ian conception of th e general common law
was probably compatible with re pect for state supreme co urt dec isions concern ing th e common law applicable in the tate- if such respec t is understood
as giving these dec isions the binding effect th eir crea tors wan ted them to have.
The sa me thing is also LTUe of th e Swiftian general co mmon law of choice of
law.
Swift concerned th e appropriate common law rule to apply to a bill of
exc hange that had been accept ed in ew York. As we all kn01 , Justice Story
did not cons ider himself bound by th e dec isions of ew York tate courts
on t·he matter. One reason, howeve r, was that New York state courts did not
think their decisions bound federal (or sister state) courts. As Story put it, "It is
observable, that the courts of New York do not found th eir dec isions upon this
point, upon any local statute, or positi ve, fixed or anc ient loca l usage; but they
deduce the doctrine from th e general principles of commercial law."'5 Story
thought he was LTea ting ew York decisions exactly the way that their creators
wanted them to be trea ted. How can that be incompatible with Erie?
I think that Story was right that New York state courts did not expect their
general common law dec isions to bind sister state and federal courts. The best
evid ence is the way they would have decided a general common law case
arising in a sister state, such as Pennsylvan ia. Like th e federal court in Swift,
they would have ignored th e dec isions of Pennsylvania state courts. '6 This
suggests that th ey th ought th eir own dec isions on th e general common law
were not binding on federal or sister state courts either.'?
The sa me point applies to the general common law of choice of law. All state
supreme courts ignore th e choice-of-law dec isions ofs i ter states when deciding
wheth er sister state law can be applied. That suggesl·s th at th ey think their own
choice-of-l aw dec isions can be ignored by si ter state courts.' 8 By ignoring
'' ee Swift v. Tyson, 4' U.S. t, 18 (1842).
'6 Green, ''S uppres eel," SS I. z- 1.3.
stronge r evidence emerged aft er Swi(lwas decided. New York courts fa vora bly cited Swift
as allowing them to ignore th e ge nera l common law decisions of sister states- even th ough in
Swi(l , of co urse, it was New York decisions that were ignored. See 11au lkner v. li ar/., 82 .Y. 413
(188o); St. iclwla,, 13cmk v. Stale at'/13ank, 27 N.E. 849,851 (N.Y. 1891).
' 8 Professo r Brilmaye r suggests th<
Jt a state supreme co urt, thinking that it has gotten th e principles
of the com mon law right , might demand that si ter states foll ow its decisions, even though it
ignores th e decisions of sister states. I think it is entirely possible that a state su preme court
might hold such l l view. Indeed in Green, ''S uppressed," Sl.l, I argue that the proper method
of howi ng deference to state supreme co urt decisions is a stale-by-slate approach, in wh ich
'7 Even
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the choice-of-law dec isions of a sta te supreme court, preva iling approaches
to choice of law give these dec isions exactly the deference that the ir creator
intends them to have (namely none).'9

111.

THE COMMON LAW METHOD

Let us set as ide these two obstacles to consider two other important the mes in
Professor Brilmayer's chapter. The first is her endorsement of wha t she calls
"the common law method " in choice oflaw. (I'll call it "the method" for short. )
As I understand her, the method describes how a state court determines the
applicability of domestic law. Rather than answering the question by reference
to a priori principles of legislative jurisdiction (as the First Restatement does) or
to essentially unan werable questions oflegislative intent (per interest analysis),
it should decide whether its law applies on the basis of precisely the sa me sort
of ethical concerns that it uses when making domestic common law in other
areas. Here I think she has, with one possible exception , go tten things exac tl y
right.
As Brilmayer herself recognizes, tl1e method is more of a description of
what courts are doing, rather than what they ought to do . Because th e metl1od
has room for "vested rights and state interests," all state courts have arguably
already been using the method, despite themselves. However, that does not
mean that accepting the method would have no consequences, for it gives state
deference is ta ilored to what the re levant state supreme court wants. T hat the Penn sylvania
Supreme Court refu ses to defer to sister states' decisions does not mea n that its decisions ca n be
ignored, for it may demand deference. evertheless, l think that it is clear that states committed
to the general common law did not hold such a view. The reason is that the very idea of th e
general common law was of a standard that could not be fixed by state (or federal) cou rt
decisions. ln the exa mple Professor Brilmayer envisions, in which th e Pennsy lva nia Supreme
Court demands deference to its decisions, it is denying that the general common law applies
in Pennsylva ni a.
The evidence that state courts did not consider their decisions binding on sister states is
particularly strong with respec t to choice of law. As Professor Bri lmaye r per uasively demonstrates, under both the Fi rst Re tatement and interest analysis, a sister state's choice-Qf-law
decisions are not binding on th e forum when it decides wheth er sister state law appli es. States
that adopt th e First Restatement or interest analysis- without some cavea t that this lack of
deference should not apply to their own choice-Qf-law decisions- must have li censed sister
states to ignore th eir decisions. lt is particul arly revealing that no state court using th e Fir t
Restatement or interest analysis has, to my knowledge, ever complained that sister states were
ignoring its choice-Qf-law deci ions.
'9 l believe that this obstacl e ca n be overcome only by arguing that Erie limi ts a state supreme
court's abili ty to free sister state (and federal ) courts of the duty to defer to its decisions. For a
disc u sion, see Creen, "'Su ppressed," Part ll.
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courts grea ter freedom in the choice-of-law arena than they currently think
they have. They could continue their adherence to th e First Restatement or
orthodox interest analys is, but they do not have to.
Because she describes the method as taking into account, inter alia, "the
substantive policy (actual or pres umed) of the laws vying for applica tion," it
might appear as if it is used by the fomm to determine the applicability of sister
state law as well. However, wh en assess ing sister state law, the forum has none
of the freedom that it has in connection with dom es tic law. It can apply sister
state law only if th e sister state's supreme court (using its own version of th e
method ) would say that sister state law applies. The point is merely that the
fomm , in deciding whether its own law should be used, can take into account
sister state interests.
l think Brilmayer herself may have slipped, however, when desc ribing how
the forum should determine the existence and slTength of these sister state
interests, for she appears to think that conceiving of them objectively - that
is, in a manner ind ependent of the dec isions of th e sist·er state's courts - is
contrary to th e lesson of Erie. Here is how she puts it:
Wh en cons idering the interests of oth er states under the co mmon law
method, however, a judge acts with the awareness that a state's law is nothing
more than wha t the state courts say it is. She or he should not assess the other
state's definition of its interests for obj ec tive validi ty, but instead accept that
definiti on on the grounds that each state formulates and interprets its own
laws.
I think thi s is a mistake. There is nothing wrong with an objec tive determination of sister state int erests, provided that it is being used to determine whether
domestic law should be applied.
To see why this is th e case, consider th e actual fa cts in Kuchinic v. McCrory. 20
One Pennsylvanian invited another to Ay with him to a football game in
Florida .21 The plane crashed in Georgia. 22 Once aga in , a Georgia guest statute
wou ld have barred the plaintiff's ac tion , and Pennsylva nia law wou ld have
allowed it. 2 3 In Kuchinic, th e negligence suit aga inst the pilot was be ing entertained by a Pennsylvania state court, wh ic h used interest analys is to apply
Pennsylva nia law to the fac ts."~
The co urt's dec ision was defended by Peter Westen on th e bas is of an
objec tive conception of sister sta te interests. Th e fact that a Georgia co urt
20
22

'4

See 422 Pa . 620 (1966).
Ibid., 621.
Ibid., 623.

" Ibid ., 622.
>Ibid., 622.
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would employ Georgia law to th e fac ts, he argued, does not mean that Georgia
is really intere ted:
[l]f the forum dec ides that a foreign state is interested in a case by looki ng
to that state's conflicts law, it subordinates its own choice of law to that
of a foreign state, however archaic the latter may be. To do so fru strates
the very goals of governmental-interest analysis. Instead, as C urrie himself
adm itted, the forum should assume final responsibility for dec iding whether
another tate is properly interested in th e facts at issue. The forum ultimately
makes such a finding not by asking whether the foreign state declares itself
to be interested, but rath er by asking whether- in light of forum poli cy that declared interest seems reasonable. Ultimately, the forum imputes those
policies to a foreign law which it could conceive a rational foreign court
adopting, were that foreign court deciding the case at hand .'S
Both Kramer and Roosevelt have criticized Westen here,'6 and it appears that
Brilmayer would as well. Nonetheless, in the context of a Pennsylvania court's
decision about whether it hould apply Pennsylvania law, Westen's comments
are correct. The court is not bound by what Georgia courts might say about
Georgia interes ts. 1t is free to conclude that Georgia has no real interes t and
thus that Pennsylvania law should be applied.
Of course, if the question is whether it is permitted to apply Georgia law,
a reliance on ob jective interests is misguided. A Pennsylvania court may not
point to Georgia's objective interest as a reason to apply Georgia law when th e
Georgia Supreme Court has sa id Georgia law does not apply. In such a case,
however, the mistake is not rea lly claiming that Georgia has an interest when
it does not, but applying Georgia law when the Georgia Supreme Court has
sa id its law does not apply.
Now as an advoca te of a particular version of the method, with its own
distinctive conception of sister state interests, Brilmayer is free to insist that the
forum should defer to a sister state supreme court's dec isions when determining
whether the sister state has an interest. However, she ca nnot claim that this
conception of sister state interests foll ows from hori zontal Erie.
1v. THE U AVO IDABLE METAPHYSICS OF CHOICE
The next theme is in curious tension with the lesson of hori zon tal Erie in
choice of law. Brilmayer suggests that "recourse to norms or concepts that are
'5

'6

Peter Kay Westen, Com ment, "False Con Ai cts," Ca lifomia Law Review 55 (1967): 85.
Kramer, "Return ," 1003; Roosevel t, "Resolving Renvoi," 1856.
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not grounded in positive law may be an unavoidabl e fact of life for choice-oflaw dec ision making." C hoice-of-law doctrine see ks to provide a "meaningful
choice" between two com peting states' laws - one that does not beg the
question to be dec ided- and that requires so me "unidentifi ed Archimedean
va ntage point. " Th e law of choice of law st·<nts looking like general com mon
law after all . Or, at th e very leas t, it cannot be solely positive law. Here I'd like
to defend Professor Brilmayer aga inst herself.
Consid er, once aga in, our Vermont state co urt's choosing between Georgia
and Pennsylvan ia law. Let· u assum e, however, that th e Geo rgia Supreme
Court wo uld have applied Georgia law and th e Pennsylva nia Supreme Court
would have applied Pennsylvania law. Under horizonta l Erie, th e Vermont
court is free to choose whi ch law applies. Brilmayer claims that in making a
choice between two states' laws, "[ t]he only pos itive law sources to turn to ...
are the two states whose domes tic substantive laws are under consideration. "
However, that is clearly fal se here. The relevant principles on the basis of
which t·he court would choo e are part of th e positive law of Vennont.
Of co urse, in creating and employing this law, the Vermont co urt hopes to
track independent norms. For example, it might seek to apply the law of the
state that has the greater interest- and whether Georgia or Pennsylvania has
a grea ter interest is not something over which Verm ont has authori ty. But any
law worth its salt seeks to trac k independent norms. Law is crea ted for reasons
and its crea tors hope that th ey have gotten the reasons right. Vermont's law of
choice of law is no more metaphysically committed than any other Vermont
law is.
Perhaps the probl em bothering Brilmayer arises wh en a court chooses
between its own law and th e law of a sister state. Let us return to Kuchinic, in
which th e Pennsylvan ia Supreme Co urt is consid ering wh ether to apply Pennsylva nia or Georgia law. To the ex tent that it is choosing in this case, it appea rs
that it must be standing outside th e very law over which it has authority.
The pu zzle might be put· thi way. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the
auth ority concerning the territorial scope of Pennsylvania law. However, when
engaging in choice-of-law reasoning, it arguably seeks to occ upy a perspec tive
oth er than that of th e expos itor of the scope of Pennsylvania law. It seeks to
choose between Pennsylvania law and Georgia law.
On the one hand , even if it does seek to occ upy thi s perspective, l do not
see why that means that there is so me una vo idabl e metaphys ics of cho ice.
Under Kramer and Roosevelt's approac h, for exa mpl e, if the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concludes that the facts fall under th e scope of Pennsylvania
law (a nd it predicts that the Georgia Supreme Co urt would say th e sa me abou t
Georgia law), it is free to choose, on th e bas is of a rul e of priority, between

A Reply to Professor Brilmayer

1

35

the two. Like th e Vermont state court's, its rule of pri ority has a source in
domestic law.
On the other hand , assume that Kramer and Roosevelt are wrong and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reasoning does not involve a two-step
approach . That would mean denying that it can occupy a standpoint independent of Pennsylvania law to choose between Pennsylvania and Georgia
law. In choo ing whether to use Pennsylvania law, it is inescapably deciding whether Pennsylvania law applies. If this is the case, then once again its
decision wou ld be guided by principles that are part of the positive law of
Pennsylvania . Of course, in relying on these principles, it probably hopes to
track considerations existing independently of its authority. As we have seen,
though, that is true of all law.

